



Adam Balcer

# Heading for the Strategic Partnership EU-Turkey in the Foreign Policy

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*We care for Europe*

Adam Balcer\*

# Heading for the Strategic Partnership EU-Turkey in the Foreign Policy

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
Since 2005 Phd candidate at the Centre for East European Studies, the University of Warsaw





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## Main points


- ◆ Strategic partnership between the European Union and Turkey would significantly increase the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Second only to Russia, Turkey is the most important neighbour of the EU in respect to demographic, economic and military issues. Its potential will grow significantly in the next decades.
- ◆ Because of its importance and growing influence in areas significant for the EU's foreign policy (the Middle East, Western Balkans, Black Sea and Central Asia), Turkey is a unique neighbour of the EU.
- ◆ Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002 Turkey has demonstrated active and independent foreign policy based on the idea of soft power, which led to a clear improvement of Ankara's relations with a number of important countries of the Eurasian region. The goal of this policy is for Turkey to reach the status of a regional power with the potential to shape political and economic processes in neighbouring regions.
- ◆ The basis for a strategic partnership between Turkey and the EU should be the soft power approach to foreign policy based on the joint acknowledgement of the necessity for political

stabilization and economic liberalization of “Eurasian Balkans<sup>1</sup>” and Northern Africa. There is however certain divergence between the EU and Turkey on how to achieve these common goals. This is due to the axiological differences between the two and for geopolitical reasons. Nevertheless, these differences do not pose an impenetrable barrier and can be resolved.

- ◆ The new foreign policy of Turkey can be either a chance or a threat to the European Union depending on how the relations between the two develop. Intensified integration between Turkey and the EU as well as Turkey’s further democratization are factors which could enhance the cohesion between the foreign policies of Ankara and Brussels. However, the relations between Turkey and the European Union are facing a crisis because of the slow pace of accession negotiations. The main reason for this situation is the unresolved Cyprus issue and the opposition to Turkey’s accession within the EU, much stronger than in the case of previous enlargements.
- ◆ Turkey and the European Union can strengthen their cooperation in foreign policy even without Turkey’s accession. However, a permanent deadlock in the accession process will significantly limit the possibility of using Turkey’s potential within the framework of the CFSP. The idea of close strategic partnership is not a substitute for Turkey’s membership in the EU. The gradual intensification of cooperation between Turkey and the European Union in respect to foreign policy will be an important argument for Turkey’s accession.
- ◆ The idea of Turkey’s accession is lacking a strategic vision. What this vision should be is the European Union as a global power which thanks to Turkey’s accession will be able to manage effective foreign policies in respect to Eurasia and North Africa, especially in the case of Muslim societies.
- ◆ A permanent crisis in the Turkey’s accession process will definitely have a negative influence on the cooperation between Brussels and Ankara. In such a case it is likely that Turkey’s

links to the countries of Eurasia will intensify, often contrary to the interests of the EU. This situation would greatly substantially limit the European Union's influence in the "Eurasian Balkans" area. On the other hand, strong bonds between the West and Turkey should prevent a "cold war" scenario between Ankara and Brussels.

- ◆ The paradigm for the cooperation between Turkey and the European Union in respect to the CFSP should be their close cooperation in the Western Balkans. 🗨️



# 2

## Turkey: A regional power in a strategic perspective


Due to its geopolitical position, Turkey boasts a unique position among all of the EU's neighbours. It is located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea as well as on the Black Sea (controlling the Bosphorus straits), between Europe and the Middle East and Caucasus. Anatolia forms a natural bridge between Europe and Central Asia. The regions neighbouring Turkey, such as the Middle East, are characterized by high instability. Furthermore a large portion of the world's oil and gas reserves are located in regions neighbouring Turkey. This means that Turkey has a high potential for being a transit country for the transport of raw materials, especially gas, to Europe. Turkey has been characterized by Zbigniew Brzezinski as a geopolitical pivot<sup>2</sup>, that is a country of critical importance for global geopolitics.

Turkey's significance is not only due to its geopolitical location but also thanks to its demographic, economic and military potential. Following Russia, Turkey is definitely the most important neighbour of the EU. The population of Turkey is over 72 million. This is more than the combined population of the Maghreb region (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia), and only slightly less than the combined population of the countries of the Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia

and Ukraine). Gross Domestic Product, calculated on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), will be \$915 billion in 2010. This means that Turkey is the 16<sup>th</sup> economy in the world, only slightly smaller than the combined economies of all of the north African countries (Maghreb and Egypt). Turkish GDP per capita (around \$13,000) is already higher than that of the poorest EU member countries (Bulgaria, Romania) and significantly higher than that of a majority of the countries belonging to the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the years 2002 – 2008 Turkey experienced an extraordinary level of development (the increase in the GDP per year being 7% on average). The global economic crisis caused, it seems, only a temporary recession. According to the OECD, Turkey should be the country with the highest growth out of all of the member countries in the years 2011-2017 (with an average growth of 6,7%)<sup>3</sup>. In the last few years Turkey has intensified its economic relations with the world, to a great extent through the increase in trade, growing number of Turkish construction contracts, investing abroad, and exceptionally high foreign investment inflows into Turkey<sup>4</sup>. While it does not have large reserves of energy resources, Turkey has a high potential for the production of renewable energy (water, wind, solar and geothermal energy)<sup>5</sup>. Turkey also has a significant military potential. The Turkish Armed Forces are the eight strongest in the world<sup>6</sup> in terms of military equipment, combat experience, training and the defence budget. Ankara is a member of the G-20, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), OECD, WTO, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is also an important partner for the USA.<sup>7</sup> The American operation in Iraq probably would not have been possible without Ankara's logistic support. Although, the American intervention in Iraq caused a crisis in the relations between Turkey and America,<sup>8</sup> Barak Obama's victory in the presidential elections led to a slight improvement in bilateral relations.

Turkey's potential will increase with time, which means that its influence on the neighbouring countries will grow as well. According to demographic forecasts the population of Turkey should reach around 100 million in 2050.<sup>9</sup> With such a population the Turkish economy will rank as the 10<sup>th</sup> – 12<sup>th</sup> economy in

the world, larger than that of Italy and only slightly smaller than the French or British economies. However, for Turkey to fully take advantage of its potential, it will have to resolve serious internal problems such as the social role of women, regional differences, the Kurdish issue, and the tension between post-Islamists and secularists, or Kemalists. Integration of the Kurds, who form a significant part of the Turkish population, is the most important of these challenges.<sup>10</sup> Due to internal tensions, Turkey is not a fully democratic country. A great advantage of Turkey is, however its propensity for quick modernization, demonstrated over the past few decades.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, EU membership could be a decisive factor in fostering the internal stabilization of Turkey as well as the neighbouring regions. 🍌



# 3

## **A general overview of the relations between Turkey and the European Union, and of the determinants of their cooperation.**

Despite many difficulties, EU membership remains Ankara's strategic goal. These aspirations constitute an integral part of an old idea of Turkey's modernization through a strengthening of the relations with the Western world. There are important economic (customs union, investment, trade<sup>12</sup>), social (the biggest non-EU diaspora in the European Community) and institutional (the accession process) links between Turkey and the EU. However Turkey's potential membership faces a strong opposition among the societies and elites of Europe – opposition stronger than that against any of the previous candidates. The citizens of the EU are deeply divided on the question of Turkey's membership.<sup>13</sup> In a number of countries – among these France and Germany – most citizens oppose Turkey's accession. On the other hand, public opinion surveys show that even in these two countries most citizens do not view Turkey's membership as bad for the EU. Furthermore, they feel that at some point it will be accepted into the European

Union. Significantly, the support for Turkey's membership among the younger generations is much higher than the EU average.<sup>14</sup> The social factor will play an especially important role in EU enlargement for the first time. This is because of the changes in the French constitution which require holding an obligatory referendum if over 40% of the members of parliament and senators support such a motion.

At the core of the opposition to Turkey's membership is its uniqueness among all candidate countries. It has a large population and serious internal and external problems, reinforced by the mutual sense of cultural and religious differences.<sup>15</sup> In the case of France and Germany, the opposition to the Turkish accession may be further interpreted as being partly caused by fear of losing influence in the EU. Many members of the EU who oppose Turkey's membership feel that as a large, poor country it will pose a threat to the process of internal integration within the EU. Turkey's supporters argue on the other hand that its accession will have a positive effect and will increase the level of democratization of the EU's neighbours, thus stabilizing its direct surroundings.<sup>16</sup> Many Turks also express concerns about EU membership, such as the fear of losing national sovereignty and identity, a perceived threat to the integrity of the country or moral "deprivation" by Western ways of life. However, in the case of a credible perspective of accession, the Turkish government should be able to overcome these fears by showing the reforms required by Brussels as necessary for EU membership.

Turkey's path towards EU membership has sometimes been called the "never-ending story". Turkey signed the Association Agreement in 1963 and applied for full membership in 1987. A breakthrough in the negotiations happened in 1999 when Ankara received a candidate status. Turkey's fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria was to determine the beginning of the negotiations. In order to reach this goal Turkey embarked on a process of "Europeization" during the years 2002-2005 by introducing many democratic reforms. As a result, Turkey began the accession negotiations in 2005. This was the "golden age" of the relations between the EU and Turkey. The balance of power in the

EU at the time played a key role in helping Ankara's membership aspirations and in allowing it to receive the status of a candidate country. However, since the second half of 2004 we have seen a deterioration in the relations between the European Union and Turkey. This was due to the accession of Cyprus which Turkey does not recognize, while being the only country in the world to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC). An attempt to unite the island just before the accession failed because of the rejection of the Annan Plan for Cyprus in a referendum by the Greek population. Before the referendum, the European Union declared it will cancel the economic embargo against KKTC if the citizens of KKTC supported the Annan Plan (which they did). Turkey on the other hand is obliged to include Cyprus in the customs union. Neither side fulfilled their obligations. Furthermore in December 2006 the EU "punished" Turkey for its negative response to a customs union with Cyprus by freezing 8 chapters under negotiation and preventing the closing of those going to be opened. Negotiations to settle the Cyprus dispute began once more in September 2008, however, to this day they did not reach any conclusion. In December 2009 Cyprus announced it will block 6 further chapters of negotiation, including Energy and Foreign, Security and Defense Policy until Turkey fulfils its obligations.

Turkey's case suffered after the recent change of guard in Europe. In 2005 Angela Merkel became the Chancellor of Germany (representing the Christian Democratic party and replacing the previous Social Democratic Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder) while in 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy became the president of France. Both are opponents to Turkey's accession. France is especially rigid on this issue and unofficially blocks the opening of 5 accession chapters. The position of Paris on this topic is a violation of the *pacta sunt servanda* principle. Following the negotiation framework accepted in 2005 by the EU, France included, the goal of negotiations is Turkey's membership in the EU. However, the negative attitude of France and Germany has significantly slowed down the pace of the negotiations. Turkey opened only twelve chapters of the negotiations and closed one. Problems in mutual relations between the EU and Turkey have diminished


popular support for the accession and weakened the determination of the elites in Turkey to continue reforms. In effect a slowing down, and in some cases even a regress of the democratization process, became evident. Because of this, the opponents of Turkey's accession gained new arguments. Consequently relations between Turkey and the EU have fallen into a vicious circle. A change in Germany's government in 2009, with the social democratic party going into opposition, didn't change substantially Berlin's attitude to Turkey's membership. Germany, which is now ruled by a coalition of the CDU and FDP (liberal, supportive of Turkey), will support the continuation of the accession negotiations, however the CDU still believes that the result of these negotiations should not be a full membership.

Turkey's closer relations with the European Union led to a visible increase of the cohesion between the Turkish and European foreign policies, even though, unlike the previous candidates, there was no complete consistency. Not opening of the chapters of Foreign, Security and Defense Policy as well as Energy and the very slow process of negotiations strengthens the divergence in foreign policies of Turkey and the European Union.<sup>17</sup>

The cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the areas of foreign policy towards the Western Balkans, countries of the European Neighbourhood and Central Asia (among these Afghanistan and Pakistan) can be enhanced by a common agreement to support economic and political reforms (in the cases of management, economic freedom, non-repressive regimes) which could lead to internal stabilization of these countries (resulting in an improvement of their material situation, and a weakening of radical movements) and create conditions for development in the economic cooperation between them and Ankara and Brussels. Turkey, like the EU, supports a peaceful regulation of armed conflicts, territorial integrity, regional cooperation, as well as an increase in the supply of energy from non-Russian sources or not transported through the Russian territory.

A lack of complete cohesion between Turkey and the EU in certain areas is due to the specific conditions that shape the Turk-

ish foreign policy. Ankara will usually show more solidarity with Muslims in the case of armed or political conflicts than countries of the EU would. As it is not a fully democratic country, Turkey is less sensitive to cases of the violation of human rights in other countries. Because of its regional position, being a direct neighbour of the Middle East and the Caucasus region, Turkey has sometimes a different perception of both interest and threats than the EU. Unlike in most of the European Union countries, the Turkish political thought is dominated by the categories of sovereignty, national interest and spheres of influence. These differences however are not permanent barriers as long as the accession process continues and Turkey becomes a member of the EU. This is shown on the previously discussed example of the increase of cohesion between the foreign policies of Turkey and the European Union which was the result of opening the membership negotiations by Ankara and of the general convergence of mutual strategic interests. Another factor which will reduce tensions between the EU and Turkey can be a similarity of their approaches to politics, especially the growing importance of soft power in Ankara's foreign policy, which will be described in the next chapter. Turkey's membership in NATO shows that Ankara is capable – in spite of some problems – of cooperation with Western partners in the case of foreign and security policies. A full democratization of Turkey which would lead to an axiological rapprochement will, in the long term, be a significant factor in increasing the cohesion of its foreign policy with that of the EU. However, this is not likely to happen without Turkey's membership in the EU. This is why Turkey's new foreign policy, which was initiated by the AKP in 2002, could be both an opportunity or a threat for Europe. 🟠





## Strategic Depth – a short characteristic of Turkey’s foreign policy under the AKP government

The AKP carried out within the framework of “Europeanization” the biggest democratic reforms in Turkey’s history. On the other hand, never in the modern history of Turkey Islam has played such a significant role in the public sphere as it plays now.<sup>18</sup> In consequence, The AKP stirs emotions both ways negative and positive because of this.

In its new foreign policy the AKP attempts to implement Ahmet Davutoglu’s concept of a “strategic depth”. Davatoglu, who has long been an advisor to Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, has recently been appointed Turkey’s Foreign Minister. He introduced the concept of “strategic depth” in a book of the same title, which was published in 2001. In this book Davatoglu declares that Turkey is a uniquely endowed in geopolitical terms and thus a key player in the global politics. This is because it is a country both European and Asian, located near Africa and on the border between the Christian and Muslim worlds. It is also a country that falls into the area of the Middle East as well as the Balkans,

Black Sea basin, Mediterranean basin and is strongly linked to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. In this sense Turkey is a politically “central” country of great strategic depth. Because of this it is highly inefficient for Turkey to limit itself to being a “bridge” between the East and West or a strategic barrier as it had been during the Cold War. Turkey’s foreign policy had been, according to Davutoglu, reactive and peripheral. Now it should be global and proactive. Such a foreign policy, Davutoglu argues, will guarantee stability among neighbouring regions. The basis of this approach should be a focus on the security of the whole region rather than individual countries, the coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups, the use of dialogue instead of force, and creating strong economic interdependencies. Political reforms are also crucial for stabilization, however they should have an evolutionary rather than revolutionary character. The use of soft power, based on the strength of the Turkish economy, as well as improving relations with neighbouring countries, should be the basis of Ankara’s growing status. Due to its unique location, the foreign policy of Turkey should be multi-directional, meaning that specific foreign policy priorities should complement rather than exclude each other. Implementing the concept of “strategic depth” requires a so-called “rhythmical” diplomacy which shapes reality and is creative rather than reactive. In this concept, Turkey should be the mediator between countries and engage in dialogue with all of the global and regional political actors. Davutoglu stressed the importance of the non-governmental sector in foreign policy.

The concept of “strategic depth” is based on seeing Turkey as the heir to the Ottoman empire, which was the most powerful state in the history of Islam and stretched out from Maghreb to the Caucasus region, the Balkans and the Indian Ocean. Seen in this light, Ankara should be responsible for the shaping of the politics in the post-imperial region.<sup>19</sup> Because of the appeal to the Ottoman legacy, “strategic depth” postulates a stronger emphasis on Turkey’s place in the world of Islam<sup>20</sup>.

Through the attempt to implement the “strategic depth” policy Turkey’s political activity in the global sphere increased signifi-

cantly over the last few years (the opening of a large number of new embassies, announcing the Year of Africa, and later the Year of Latin America, organizing summits with African countries or historic visits of high-ranking politicians). Ankara has also significantly increased its humanitarian aid across the world. The activity of the non-governmental sector abroad also visibly increased and in 2008 Turkey was elected to the United Nations Security Council,<sup>21</sup> achieving very wide international support. Since 2004, a Turkish citizen has been the secretary general of the OIC, the second largest international organization in the world (the first being the UN), being elected for the second term with a huge majority of votes. Together with Spain, Turkey has also launched the Alliance of Civilizations – an initiative, under the auspices of the UN and supported by the EU, for promoting dialogue between cultures. At the same time, the political and economic activity of Turkey in neighbouring regions (the Balkans, Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Southern Caucasus region) increased radically<sup>22</sup>. Turkish popular culture, for example television shows, music or soccer, has become very popular in those areas. Relations with a number of significant countries, for example Russia and Iran, have improved as well. Never before had Turkey been so active, had been so well perceived abroad, and had such significant influence in some regions as it does now. Its relations are generally proper even with antagonized countries and political powers. Thanks to these factors Turkey has on a number of occasions acted as mediator in regional conflicts.<sup>23</sup>


The principle of “strategic depth” evident in Turkey’s foreign policy has led to many diplomatic achievements. However, it also made some of Turkey’s weaknesses and the challenges that it is facing more evident. Turkey remains a rather poor country, and faces many internal problems, for example the Kurdish issue. This hinders it from reaching its full potential. Additionally, because it is both secular and Muslim, some partners are wary to accept it as “one of their own”. Turkey’s non-Arab character for example may be a problem for it in the Middle East. While mediating in some conflicts, it turned out that sometimes it had problems with exerting pressure, taking action against its own public opinion and

keeping an objective, non-particular stance towards both sides. In some conflicts Turkey's mediation was limited only to being a messenger between the different sides of the conflict which clearly undermines its aspirations to be a regional power capable of influencing others' behaviour. Similarly Turkey's promotion of political reform in neighbouring countries has, at times, been exaggerated, and sometimes seemed to be pure rhetoric. Its attempts to keep good relations with its neighbours meant, in some cases tolerating the violation of human rights in some regions and accepting governments with limited legitimacy. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the soft power approach is disputable in regions where hard power and "perfidious" diplomatic games are practiced as this may lead to Turkey's good intentions being manipulated by other countries. Finally, in the case of strong tensions between antagonistic players, trying to maintain good relations with both of them is problematic and sometimes leads to a decline in the relations with one of the sides.

The key problem of the "strategic depth" principle is that it treats all of the different vectors of foreign policy as equally important and avoids ordering the principles in some sort of hierarchy while the European aspirations should be the primary concern for Ankara, current problems notwithstanding. The reason for this is that Europe would provide the best conditions for Turkey to fulfil its potential and thus its role in the surrounding countries. However, closer relations with some of the anti-Western countries will weaken Ankara's position in Europe. Unfortunately, this sort of argumentation is less common nowadays due the tensions between Turkey, Europe and the United States as well as the decrease in support for EU membership among the population, an improvement in the economic situation (which means less dependency on outside help) and finally Ankara's stronger position in neighbouring regions.

Despite above-mentioned objections, the concept of „strategic depth" should be generally evaluated positively as a possible platform for establishment of strategic partnership between the EU and Turkey. In "strategic depth" a clear fascination of the EU soft power model can be noticed. An appearance of this

concept in the Turkish foreign policy is an effect of the European integration process. It brought about Turkey's democratization including decrease of the army influence – an institution per se thinking in hard power categories and opening of the Turkish economy to the external world (economization of foreign policy). Last but not least, one of the crucial foundations of the Turkish soft power, increasing Turkey's attractiveness as a partner in the neighboring countries is the accession process. Turkey's engagement in its neighborhood also has an European dimension. Its aim is to increase attractiveness of Turkish candidacy in the EU by presenting Ankara as an important regional stakeholder. However, in the situation of deepened crisis of the accession process Davutoglu's concept gradually becomes an alternative to the membership in the EU. The serious tensions in the Turkish relationships with the EU and US were one of the most important – although, not only one-factor pushing Turkey in the direction of rapprochement with the Eurasian powers, including anti-Western states. The Turkish foreign policy, preserving sort of continuity is characterized by an evolution from deep Europeanization (2002-2005) to soft Europeanization with mild version of Eurasiatism (since 2005). The next stage could be a marginalization of Europeanization and deep Eurasiatism. This negative trend can be only reversed by reactivation of Turkey's accession process. The European integration process also could play a role of anchor preventing negative tendencies present in "strategic depth." 🍌



# 5

## **An Audit of the foreign policies of Turkey and the European Union**

### **5.1 Common Security and Defense Policy**

Turkey, as a NATO member with a large, well-armed and well-trained army, is significant to the EU in issues of hard security. It has a lot of military experience, especially in mountain and desert conditions, which is particularly significant for the potential missions of the EU in the Eurasia and Africa. Turkey is also important for the EU's soft security as it is the main route of drug trafficking from Afghanistan and illegal immigration from the Middle East.

In order for the EU to have the status of a global power and for its policies towards the European Neighborhood to be effective, the Common Security and Defense Policy must be developed. The budget that the EU spends on defense is second in the world and it is about half of the budget of the Pentagon. However the EU's military capabilities, especially logistics, leave much to be desired when compared to those of the USA. Their expediency

depends in good part on an intensification of the cooperation between the EU and NATO. While Turkey is willing to join the CSDP, it will do so if it receives a clear perspective of joining the EU in the future. Because it does not recognize Cyprus, Turkey is currently sceptical of cooperation between NATO and the European Union and by blocking the relations between the two Ankara exerts pressure on Brussels. On the other hand, some of the European countries, for example Cyprus and France, are trying to prevent Turkey from taking a more significant role in the CSDP. Due to these problems negotiations on the military agreement between Turkey and the EU and Turkish cooperation with European Defense Agency are both at a deadlock.

It is because of such problems that Turkey took part in only seven out of 23 EU-led military and civil missions. Among these, five were in the Balkans and two in Africa. Even though Turkey is influential in the Middle East and Afghanistan, it did not participate in any mission in these regions.

Despite these impediments, cooperation between Turkey and the EU in the CSDP is not impossible and there has been close mutual assistance between the two sides in the war against terror and organized crime. Turkish officers have also served in Eurocorps created within the framework of the Western European Union. Furthermore, a combined Italian, Turkish and Romanian EU battle group is to be operational in mid 2010. Turkey is also an observer within the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), formed by France, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Italy, while Poland and Belgium are candidates to join. Turkish soldiers and police take part in all of the EU military and civilian missions in the Balkans. They are engaged in the military EUFOR/ALTHEA and the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the EULEX mission in Kosovo. This shows that Turkey's participation in EU missions is possible at a large scale even now despite the unresolved Cyprus problem. 🟠

# Recommendations for the European Union

- ◆ A determined and conclusive commitment to the unification of Cyprus
- ◆ Engaging Turkey into all of the EU missions
- ◆ Signing of a military agreement between the EU and Turkey

## 5.2 Energy

Turkey is of vital importance for the EU in the case of gas supply diversification. The demand for gas is and will be growing in the future decades. Almost half of the EU's gas supply comes from three countries: Russia, Norway, Algeria. It seems imperative that the European Union secures additional supply of energy from other sources. Turkey is a natural intermediary for the transfer of gas supplies from regions such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, Turkmenistan<sup>24</sup> and even Russia to Europe.

Cooperation between the EU and Turkey over energy consists of two aspects: the institutional side (the negotiations for Turkey's membership in the EU's Energy Community Treaty which began in September 2009) and joint gas projects such as the Nabucco and TGI pipelines. The EU and Turkey have similar interests in energy issues. Both are interested in the diversification of energy supply and Turkey sees itself as a transit country. Turkey's ambition to become an energy hub (gaining additional revenue from re-exporting gas from producers to third countries) may badly affect Turkey-EU cooperation. However, the agreement on the Nabucco pipeline shows that Turkey is flexible in this area and aware of its

own limitations and the necessity of finding a compromise between the transit country, the customer and the producer.

In order to secure a diverse supply of gas to the EU, a southern corridor for the transport of gas should be pursued to connect Europe with the Middle East and Central Asia. This would be hard to achieve without Turkey's cooperation<sup>25</sup>.

Since 2007 a Turkey-Greece interconnection (TGI) pipeline has been active and it is now to be extended to Italy and Bulgaria. Nabucco is also of key importance. Turkey is the most important member of this project as the longest fragment of the pipeline is to run through its territory<sup>26</sup>. The Nabucco pipeline is to transport natural gas from Central Asia and the Middle East, through Anatolia to EU member countries located in the Balkans and Central Europe. The construction of this pipeline has been agreed on in July 2009 and is to be realized in the years 2010-2014. Currently, Turkey is supplied with gas by Azerbaijan and Iran, and in 2011 it will also get supplies from Egypt. However this will not be enough to fill up the Nabucco and TGI pipelines. Nonetheless, a start of the Nabucco pipeline would be an important signal which would strengthen the efforts to diversify gas supplies. Making a complete use of the southern energy corridor in order to ensure this diversification would be ensured by constructing pipelines to Turkey from Iran, Qatar, Iraq and Turkmenistan<sup>27</sup>. All of these plans are difficult to achieve and face grave political challenges, especially a negative approach of Russia, the tense relations between Iran and the West, and the problem of a division of profits from the export of energy materials from Iraq.

One of the important factors which will influence the development of gas infrastructure in the Black Sea region and the Middle East will be Turkey's relations with the supplier countries on the one hand and producers, on the other. In the last few years Turkey has been very active in energy policy, signing a number of contracts and presenting plans for new pipelines. The most recent of Ankara's ideas is the construction of a pipeline going from Qatar (which has 14% of the world's gas reserves) thro-

ugh Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria to Turkey. Any improvement in relations between Brussels and Iran (which owns 16% of the world's oil deposits) would also be a game changer in terms of energy supplies, enhancing the role of Turkey as a transit hub<sup>28</sup>. Turkey's cooperation with Iraq and Azerbaijan has encountered certain political and economic problems. Significantly, Azerbaijan is a potential transit country for the supply of gas from Turkmenistan<sup>29</sup>. A further challenge to the efforts to diversify energy suppliers through a cooperation with Turkey is the joint Russian and Italian project called South Stream, which would transport gas from Russia to the Balkans and finally to Italy and Central Europe, omitting Ukraine which is currently the most important transit country for Russian gas<sup>30</sup>. As this project is very costly, Russia might choose to construct Blue Stream II pipeline to Turkey. In such circumstances Turkey would become a transit country for Russian gas as well. 🍌

# Recommendations for the European Union

- ◆ Starting the construction of the Nabucco pipeline while lobbying in Turkmenistan and Iran for them to take part in the project.
- ◆ Joint diplomatic effort of the EU and Turkey aimed at solving controversial political issues undermining the prospect of Nabucco's realization such as dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on delimitation of the seabed, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the complex relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan and a lack of agreement regarding the distribution of profit from gas exploitation in Iraq.
- ◆ Signing a contract with Turkey concerning its membership in the Energy Community Treaty.


## 5.3 Western Balkans


The Western Balkans are surrounded on all sides by the countries of the EU. However, despite a definite improvement of the situation in this region it is clear that it continues to be a potential threat to the soft security of the EU (organized crime, smuggling, public unrest and armed incidents).<sup>31</sup> Western Balkans are politically unstable because of the high level of corruption, weak institutions, fierce political conflicts and ethnic divisions.<sup>32</sup> Yet, the region has close economic and political links with the EU and remains the focus for most of the EU's external activity – conflict prevention missions, special envoys<sup>33</sup>, financial aid and the enlargement process. The scale of the European Union's activity in the Balkans is so high that it might be termed a CFSP laboratory.

The cooperation between Turkey and the European Union is especially close and effective in this region. A significant example is the high scale of Turkey's participation in the EU missions<sup>34</sup>. Turkey took part in five out of six EU missions. It is in the interest of both Brussels and Ankara that the region should be stabilized through the EU accession. Both Turkey and the EU agree on the necessity of investigating and persecuting for the war crimes committed during the wars in the 1990's through the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, as well as bringing about a reconciliation of the nations of the Balkans and shaping Bosnia into a functioning country. Turkey recognized the independence of Kosovo along with 22 EU countries. On Turkey's initiative, the Alliance of Civilization became the new aspect of cooperation with the EU in the Western Balkans. Within its framework of the Alliance a conference of Balkan countries in which some EU representatives took part was held in December 2009. The members of the conference accepted a Regional Strategy prepared by Turkey, which entailed an intensification of efforts towards the integration and future EU accession of the Western Balkans, as well as further development of projects in areas such as education, media, culture and the non-governmental sector in order to improve ethnic relations in the region.

The EU is clearly the most important force acting in the Balkans. However, Turkey has significant political and economic influence in the less stabilized countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia<sup>35</sup>. Due to this influence on a number of occasions Turkey acted as a sponsor of these countries, supporting them internationally and also in their relations with the EU<sup>36</sup>.

In terms of regional organizations, Turkey can be considered a Balkan country. As the leader of the Organization of the Islamic Conference it is a member of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council an organization responsible for implementation of Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Ankara's relations with all the countries of the region are proper, and this allows it to act in the role of a mediator (in Bosnia for example).<sup>37</sup> The large Muslim population is the

main basis for Ankara's influence in the Western Balkans. Around a third of the inhabitants of the region are Muslims with strong links to Turkey. The importance of the Muslim communities will increase as their population growth rate is higher than the other religious communities. Today, the majority of the populations of Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo is Muslim, as is a large portion of the citizens of Macedonia.<sup>38</sup> Turkey's efforts to restrain the extremist Islamic influence from the Middle East among the Balkan Muslims is of great significance. The Turkish Diyanet, which regulates religious affairs, acts as a patron for Muslim societies through financial aid and supporting education. The religious structures of the Balkans belong to the Eurasian Islamic Council organized by the Diyanet in 1995, gathering also Muslim communities from the Western Europe and former Soviet Union. Turkey's strong position in the region is also due to efforts in training the armed and police forces of Western Balkan countries.<sup>39</sup> 



# Recommendations for the EU

- ◆ Presenting an EU-Turkey joint plan for the reform of Bosnia.
- ◆ Increasing the quality and quantity of Turkish participation in the EU mission in Kosovo through assigning higher positions to Turkey.
- ◆ Establishing a special mechanism, such as regular summits, to facilitate relations between the EU and candidate countries from the Balkans (Turkey included).

## 5.4 The Black Sea and Southern Caucasus

Since the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 the European Union has become part of the Black Sea region. This is significant for Europe because of the proximity to the three most important neighbours of the EU: Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The region is also characterized by lack of stability and significant economic and political activity of the United States.<sup>40</sup> The Black Sea is of geostrategic significance as it connects Europe with Asia and can be seen as a gateway into Central Asia and Iran. Brussels is active in this region through two initiatives: the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership.<sup>41</sup> There are also two active EU missions in the region (in Georgia<sup>42</sup> and Moldova) and two Special Representatives (Moldova and Southern Caucasus). The European Union has the status of an observer to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) which is the only organization which encompasses the whole region. The EU also

plays an important role in the peace negotiations between Russia and Georgia.

While the European Union is an important economic partner to the Black Sea members of the Eastern Partnership, its economic influence is not dominant.<sup>43</sup> The influence of Russia in this region is very significant when it comes to energy and labour market issues. Some of the EU member states, for example Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom support the EU accession of countries of this region in the long term. However, the majority of EU members only support the scenario of close cooperation.

Turkey declares support for the European Union's activities in the Black Sea area on condition that Brussels consults policies regarding the region with Turkey. Because of its status as the largest country of the Black Sea region apart from Russia, Ankara feels its position is privileged and it should be engaged in the implementation of policies regarding the area. Turkey is not interested in eliminating the influence of the West in the region. As a country weaker than Russia (the strongest country in the region), Ankara understands very well that the activities of the EU, coordinated with its own, can balance out the influence of Moscow. Through maintaining good relations with both Russia and the West, Turkey may manoeuvre between the two in order to secure its own position around the Black Sea.


Both the European Union and Turkey support the integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova and agree on the significance of peace talks aiming at settling the status of the separatist regions in the territories of these countries. Just like the EU, Turkey is willing to cooperate with Russia on issues involving the Black Sea region. However, Russia remains sceptical of the involvement of Brussels in the region's politics. An improvement in the relations between the EU and Turkey would increase the chances of engaging Russia in joint regional activity as it will most probably try to avoid isolation. Thanks to the improvement of relations between Turkey and Russia, Ankara has some potential to influence Moscow.<sup>44</sup> Relations between the two coun-

tries are at their best since the beginning of the modern era, and maintaining this state of affairs is important for both Russia and Turkey.<sup>45</sup> However, because Turkey has a smaller demographic and economic potential and is dependent on Russian supplies of gas (over 60%) its relations with Russia are rather asymmetrical.<sup>46</sup> One of the main reasons for the improvement in Turkey-Russia relations are tensions in the relations between Turkey and the United States and the EU. Because of this, Turkey has been unwilling to adopt a tougher position versus Moscow.<sup>47</sup> However, claims that Russia and Turkey are now in a strategic partnership are exaggerated as there are still significant differences of interests between the two. Turkey's position on many issues can be characterised as being between those of the EU and Russia, like for example when it comes to its neutral reaction to the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.

Turkey's cooperation with the EU in an institutional dimension is currently based on participation in the Black Sea Synergy and possibility to participate as a third-state in multilateral projects of the Eastern Partnership. Ankara supported the election of the EU as an observer to the BSEC. Turkey promotes the idea of giving the observers, for example the European Commission, more of a say in the activities of the BSEC. Brussels on the other hand, supported the Turkish Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform, which was to help start diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, and settle the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Turkey controls the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and thus the main trade route for most of the countries of the Black Sea region. Istanbul, which is located on the Bosphorus strait, dominates the whole region and is visited by millions of citizens from the countries on the Black Sea coast. The formation of the BSEC was Ankara's initiative. Turkey's strong position in this region is due to its capability to maintain good relations with Georgia, Ukraine, Russia and (informally) Abkhazia at the same time.<sup>48</sup> Turkey's economic influence in the Black Sea region<sup>49</sup>, especially in the Southern Caucasus (in Georgia and Azerbaijan) is also significant.<sup>50</sup> They key element

of the relations between Turkey and these countries is energy cooperation (for example the Baku-Tibilisi-Erzurum and Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan pipelines.) Turkey is also important for Georgia and Azerbaijan in military terms – although in the case of Georgia the relations have weakened lately.<sup>51</sup> Turkey's position in the region, is strengthened as it acts as a protector of Turkish and Muslim minorities in Adjara, Gagauzia and Crimea there. The closed border and lack of relations with Armenia remains the biggest challenge in Turkey's foreign policy in the region. In 2008, Turkey attempted to repair the relations with Armenia, however this project was badly perceived by Azerbaijan.<sup>52</sup> Because of this, it is unlikely that the Turkish parliament will push through the protocols for normalisation of the relations with Armenia unless there is some progress in the negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning Karabakh.<sup>53</sup> Turkey hopes that Russia, the EU and Unites States will help settle the issue. 🟠



# Recommendations for the EU

- ◆ Inviting Turkey into the preparation and implementation processes of a new strategy for Southern Caucasus, as well as into multilateral projects of the Eastern Partnership.
- ◆ Developing a “road map” for the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform together with Turkey.
- ◆ Helping to settle the Karabakh problem through economic and financial help which would allow the Turkish parliament to push through the protocols normalising relations between Turkey and Armenia.

## 5.5 Central Asia

Central Asia is important for the EU because it is rich in energy resources (gas, oil, coal and uranium).<sup>54</sup> The region is also significant in geostrategic terms as it is located between China and the Black Sea region as well as in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan and Iran. The economic influence of the EU in this region is limited, though it has been growing during the last couple of years.<sup>55</sup> China, Russia and the United States are the strongest powers engaged in Central Asia. The influence of Beijing is constantly growing, while that of Russia is slowly decreasing. Both Turkey and the EU regard it a necessity to strengthen the relations of the West with this region in order to balance out the influence of China and Russia<sup>56</sup>. In order to reach this aim Ankara and Brussels are working closely with the United States. Therefore the development of energy cooperation with Central Asia is of great importance for both Turkey and the European Union. Because of its attempts to keep control

over the transit of energy resources from Central Asia to Europe, Russia's perception of these efforts is rather negative. Turkey, which is not powerful enough to shape events in the region on its own accord, is more willing to cooperate with the EU than it is in the case of the Black Sea. In the case of human rights issues and relations with local regimes there is some amount of cohesion between the policies of the EU and Turkey. In 2005 both sides condemned Uzbekistan over a crack-down on demonstrators, which caused a temporary rift in relations with Tashkent. However, relations with Uzbekistan have improved over the last few months. Because the European Union's activity in Central Asia began only recently, cooperation between Turkey and the EU is quite limited. Turkey joined much of the EU's growing activity, for example becoming participant of both EU-Central Asia Forums, which were organised in December 2008 and September 2009.

Despite being less influential than Beijing or Moscow, Turkey is definitely an important power in the whole region. Its relations with Central Asia are based on a common cultural background. The cooperation between Turkic countries was institutionalised during the last few months. In 2009, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Turkey signed an agreement to establish a Turkic-Speaking Countries Cooperation Council. The headquarters of the Council is to be located in Istanbul and both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have been invited to participate.

Turkey is an important economic and political partner of all countries of Central Asia.<sup>57</sup> Currently Turkey has the biggest influence in Turkmenistan and is one of its most important partners since the death of Turkmenbashi in 2006.<sup>58</sup> It is important to remember that Turkmenistan owns the biggest deposits of gas in the region (around 4.5% of the world's gas resources). If an agreement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on the delimitation of seabed where huge sources of gas are located could be reached, this would be a very useful additional source of gas for the Nabucco pipeline. An increase in the export of raw materials (gas from Turkmenistan in the case of Nabucco, and oil from Kazakhstan through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) would be likely to have a positive impact on Turkey's influence in Central Asia. 🟠

# Recommendations for the EU

- ◆ Engaging Turkey in the process of shaping and implementing a new European Strategy towards Central Asia.
- ◆ Coordination of elements of the European economic policy directed towards the region especially with regard to energy with Ankara.

## 5.6 Afghanistan and Pakistan

Afghanistan and Pakistan (Afpak)<sup>59</sup> are very significant for the European Union with regard to both hard and soft security due to the war against the Taliban and the Al-Qaida, in which many of the EU member states are directly involved, Afghanistan and Pakistan are major challenges for the EU because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the massive production of heroin in Afghanistan, illegal immigration into the EU, a large Afghan and Pakistani minorities in the EU, especially Britain, and the tense relations between Islamabad and Delhi due to the Kashmir issue, which could evolve into an armed conflict.

The European Union has a Special Representative active in Afghanistan and it has deployed a police mission in the region. The member countries of the EU together with the European Commission are the number one source of economic support for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The European Union intensified its relations with Pakistan in the last few months and accepted the first Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the autumn of 2009. However, considering the challenges to security as well as the growing need for financial aid in the region,

the European Union's activity is smaller relative to that offered to some other poor countries. The police mission, which still lacks around one third of the contingent, is too small and the EU is reluctant to involve itself with the civilian dimension (for example by providing judges or advisors).

There is a complete overlap between the interests of the European Union and Turkey in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both sides have interest in ending the Taliban rebellion, the elimination of Al-Qaida and improvement of relations between Pakistan and its neighbours. Both Ankara and Brussels favour a greater role for soft power rather than trying to solve problems mainly through military action. Currently there is a bilateral consultation mechanism between the EU Special Representative and representatives of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding activity in Afpak. However the conflict between Brussels and Turkey regarding the CSDP due to the unresolved Cyprus issue hinders cooperation between NATO and the EU. As a result Croatia, Norway and Canada are the non-EU countries taking part in the European mission in Afghanistan rather than Turkey.

Ankara has reasonably large economic and political influence in Afghanistan. Through the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), which also encompasses Central Asia and Iran, Turkey is connected with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The strongest point of Ankara is its role of mediator between Kabul and Islamabad<sup>60</sup> during their disputes (e.g. border issues, accusations of interference in the internal affairs), Turkey also initiated cooperation between the two in their actions against the Taliban rebels. Another aspect of Turkish policy in the region is its huge engagement in the NATO mission in Afghanistan (ISAF), especially in its civil aspect (for example social project and PRT),<sup>61</sup> substantial financial aid<sup>62</sup> and a significant activity in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup> Turkey has also declared recently that it could play a role of mediator between moderate Taliban and the government in Kabul. Relations between Turkey and Afghanistan are further strengthened through Turkey's leverage on the Turkic inhabitants of the country. Around

12% of Afghanistan's population, mostly Uzbeks, are of Turkic origin. In Pakistan, relations with Turkey are based on the connections between the armies of both countries. Further, some of the Pakistani officers view Turkey's secularism as a model for development. Turkey can also become an example for both countries in the sphere of religious education.<sup>64</sup> 🍌

# Recommendations for the EU

- ◆ Inviting Turkey to the implementation of the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan through specific projects.
- ◆ Regular participation of the EU's Special Representative in meetings between Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

## 5.7 The Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are the most important of all of the European Union's neighbour regions, first of all because of the large and growing Muslim diaspora in the EU, and secondly due to the serious soft and hard security threats from the troubled region.<sup>65</sup> Terrorism, the Israeli-Arab conflict, illegal emigration and the threat of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons are the biggest challenges facing Europe. The Union for the Mediterranean is the biggest and most significant EU initiative in this region.<sup>66</sup> The goal of this organization is to form a European-Mediterranean Partnership, which would guarantee a network of political, economic and social ties between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. The European Union is also in regular contact with most of the more significant organisations active in the region, for example the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. While it is a key economic partner to the countries of Maghreb, it does not have very strong economic relations with the Middle East. Brussels is also involved in the peace process between Israel and Palestine through participation in the Quartet on the Middle East. Three countries

of the EU (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have also negotiated with Iran to place its nuclear program under international control. There are three missions in the Middle East (one in Iraq and two in Palestine) as well as two Special Representatives in the whole region.<sup>67</sup> Brussels is the most important donor for Palestine, and one of the most important in Iraq. The UN mission in Lebanon (UNFIL) is led by the European Union to a large extent. However the launching of the Union for the Mediterranean did not lead to a significant increase in regional cooperation. The EU missions are also limited in their effectiveness and Europe is treated as a power of secondary importance in the peace process in the region.

There is a general cohesion between the EU and Turkish positions on the future of the MENA region. Both support the formation of two states as the solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They are also against Iran's domination in the Middle East and possession of nuclear weapons. Both Ankara and Brussels support Iraq's territorial integrity, stabilization of Lebanon and intensified relations between the whole region and the West.<sup>68</sup>

However, there are certain differences of opinion between Turkey and the European Union on some Middle Eastern issues. These differences, though not fundamental, are nonetheless the biggest divergence between the EU's and Turkey's foreign policy.

Turkey, which is ruled by a "post-Islamist" party, regards Israel more critically than Europe does. It is also less sensitive of its perception of threat from Iran. Turkey maintains relations with all of the Islamic powers, even those which the West perceives as anti-Western regimes or groups accused of supporting terrorism. Due to this approach, as well as its border with Iran, Turkey strictly opposes using force against Iran and treats sanctions against it as a solution of last resort. Turkey also maintains good relations with Syria, Sudan, Hamas and Hezbollah. On the other hand, the EU considers Hamas to be a terrorist organisation. After the success of Hamas in the parliamentary elections, the European Union froze relations with the Palestinian government. Ankara on the other hand recognized the new

government as democratically legitimate.<sup>69</sup> Iran is criticised by the EU for supporting terrorism, denying the Holocaust, officially promoting an idea of the eradication of Israel and for the lack of sufficient cooperation with the international community in the case of its nuclear program. The EU has also voiced concern over the presidential election process in Iran in 2009. Turkey, on the other hand, recognized the result of the Iranian election. Turkey's prime minister Recep Erdogan, named the president of Iran a "friend to Turkey"<sup>70</sup> during the last visit in October 2009. Turkey also opposed the International Criminal Court's charge for genocide of Omar Al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, while the EU supported it.

Turkey responds to the criticism of the West by arguing it is acting behind the curtains to persuade the anti-Western powers into changing their policies. The EU's boycott of certain powers in the region – for example Hamas – only limits its effectiveness according to Turkey because it leads these powers to remain entrenched in their current positions. Furthermore it is inconsistent, as the EU does maintain unofficial relations with the Palestinian Islamists and formal relations with the Hezbollah. Ankara argues that its own strategy is much more effective, and points to the pro-Western evolution of Syria, which has recently signed an association agreement with the EU.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, Turkey was unable to influence any radical powers, for example Hamas,<sup>72</sup> effectively.

Despite such problems, Turkey has been cooperating with the EU in the MENA region through membership in the Union for the Mediterranean<sup>73</sup> as well as through the Organisation for Islamic Conference, and the Expanded Ministerial Meeting of Iraq's Neighbours.<sup>74</sup> It was mainly thanks to a Turkish initiative that the EU became part of this meeting. Turkish armed forces are also an important contingent within the UNFIL mission, which is led de facto by the EU. Turkey has also attempted to mediate between the EU and anti-Western powers in the region<sup>75</sup>. Brussels has the potential to influence Turkey's policy in the Middle East. In November 2009, Turkey, under pressure of the European Union, "persuaded" the president of Sudan not to attend the OIC summit in Istanbul.

In an attempt to remain on good relations with both Brussels and Teheran, Turkey abstained from voting in the International Atomic Energy Association to condemn Iran for the construction of an uranium enrichment plant in Kum in 2009.<sup>76</sup>

Turkey's new approach to foreign policy was the most spectacular in the MENA region. There were historic visits by Turkish leaders and their counterparts in the region in both directions, often for the first time in decades. The increase of diplomatic exchange and improvement of relations with many of the region's countries has been markedly significant. In terms of economic relations, the effects of Ankara's new policy far exceeded anything seen before.<sup>77</sup> Turkey is also active for the first time in humanitarian aid and civil society promotion.<sup>78</sup> Its engagement in the Middle East should be interpreted as a result of the AKP's post-Islamist character, though the radical changes in the balance of power in the Middle East due to the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, was also a factor. Following the intervention, Kurds in northern Iraq gained a historic level of autonomy. Turkey's recent association as observer to the most significant regional organisations such as the Arab League or the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was a manifestation of how significant become Turkey's involvement in the matters of the Middle East. There was also a radical improvement of Turkey's relations with Syria<sup>79</sup> and Iran after 2002. Apart from the change of government in Turkey, concerns about the strengthening Kurdish influence after the war in Iraq was a major factor contributing to the improvement of the relations.

In the Middle East Turkey has managed until recently to achieve the unique status of a country with good relations with all the significant powers of the region. Thanks to this Turkey could act as a mediator between the countries of the Middle East and the West. Some of its initiatives can be considered major successes, for example the internal issues of Iraq and Lebanon, freeing hostages and prisoners, or solving the crisis in the relations between Syria and Iraq.<sup>80</sup> However some ended in fiascos like the mediation between Syria and Israel. In some cases Turkey's offer of mediation was rejected by one of the sides, like in the

case of Iran's rejection of Turkish mediation in the negotiations with the West about the nuclear programme in December 2009. The proof of growing Turkish influence was the invitation issued by the French president to Ahmet Davutoglu (then the foreign affairs adviser to prime minister Erdogan) to join the delegation to many of the capitals in the Middle East, which aimed to lead to a ceasefire in Gaza.

Turkey's aspirations to act as a regional negotiator were based on good relations with Israel. However, the recent rise of a rightwing coalition in Israel which is sceptical towards Ankara's role as a mediator with Syria and the peace process, as well as Turkey's severe criticism of Israel during the operation in Gaza, caused a major rift in relations between Tel-Aviv and Ankara.

This process reached its peak in October 2009 when Turkey cancelled NATO air force manoeuvres to which Israel was to be invited. There have been other instances of Turkey's criticism of Israel throughout the years 2002-2009 when Israeli military actions led to the death of many civilians in Lebanon and Palestine. However, relations usually improved quickly through frequent diplomatic visits<sup>81</sup> and economic and military<sup>82</sup> cooperation. Despite of the current crisis, Turkey remains a unique partner to Israel, as it is its only important trade partner in the region, and the only Muslim country which can be visited by Israeli tourists on a large scale.

Turkey's economic and political influence in Syria and Iraq is the strongest of all the MENA countries.<sup>83</sup> Both countries maintain strong political relations with Turkey and together they established the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council. As the strongest of the three, Turkey acts as an intermediary aiming to resolve conflicts between Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, Turkey's significance should grow as the relations with the autonomous Kurdistan ameliorate and, simultaneously, the rights of Kurds in Turkey improve.<sup>84</sup> Iraqi Kurdistan already has developed strong economic links with its northern neighbour. Turkey is also very actively cooperating with Qatar in the region of the Persian Gulf. Energy projects (such as the pipeline to Turkey) may cause a significant


intensification in the relations between Turkey and Qatar. There has also been an improvement in political and economic cooperation between Turkey and Egypt since 2009.<sup>85</sup> Considering the potential of both Turkey and Egypt, their joint cooperation could have a very positive influence on the Middle East.

Turkey has also become an important partner to Iran.<sup>86</sup> Both countries are interested in energy cooperation, for example in the transport of Iranian gas through Turkey into the European market. Being two largest countries in the region, they seek a *modus vivendi*. Turkey's significance in Iran was demonstrated in November 2009 when Iran agreed to stock uranium on the Turkish territory, which was suggested by the International Atomic Energy Association after the reluctance of the Iranian government towards stocking it in Russia.

However, despite these positive processes, there is an off-stage rivalry between Iran and Turkey regarding the status of a regional superpower. Turkey is a richer country with a bigger economy and perspectives for a faster economic growth. It is also much more stable politically and has a significantly better standing in the international community. From the point of view of the European Union, a rise of Turkey rather than Iran would be favourable. Turkey is a definitely a more democratic country. As a Sunni country it has a much better image among the Arabs, rather than the increasingly authoritarian Shiite Iran. Because of this the Arab Sunni majority perceives Turkey as having the potential to balance out the growing influence of Iran in the region. Nonetheless, Turkey avoids being categorised as a protector of the Sunnis.<sup>87</sup> Sometimes, however, it does act as a guardian of the Sunnis, for example in their integration into the public life of Iraq.


Turkey's soft power in MENA is based on Ankara's attractiveness to different social and political groups. Its image among the Arab societies of the region is very good for the first time for many years. For this reason there is also a high level of acceptance towards Turkey's policies in the region.<sup>88</sup> Many of the parties of the Middle East which want to remain moderately Is-

lamic and reject the use of violence treat the AKP as a point of reference. A party in Morocco actually chose the same name as the AKP.<sup>89</sup> On the other hand as Turkey is a secular country, it is perceived well in secular environment. The clearest example of how the perception of Turkey among the countries of the Middle East changes was the support of Ankara's EU integration by the Arab League during the EU summit in 2005 which Turkey was to begin its accession negotiations. The policies that the EU adopts towards Turkey have been perceived by the Arab world as an exam of the EU attitude towards Islam.<sup>90</sup> Therefore Turkey's accession could guarantee that the EU would be perceived as a trustworthy partner to the world of Islam, and this could be of key importance for the position of Europe on the global stage in the 21st century. 🟠



# Recommendations for the EU:

- ◆ Engaging Turkey in efforts to solve the nuclear problem in Iran, for example through the transfer of Iranian uranium to Turkey and transforming it into nuclear fuel.
- ◆ In the case of Iran's rejection of the proposal, convincing Turkey to vote for, or at least abstain from voting against, sanctions on Teheran during the session of UN Security Council . This could be achieved through voicing the necessity of a synchronised foreign policy of member and candidate countries.
- ◆ With the help of Turkey, convincing Palestinian fractions to form a government of national unity which would begin peace negotiations with Israel.
- ◆ Support for Turkey's role as a mediator in the negotiations between Israel and Syria.
- ◆ Mediation between Israel and Turkey in order to improve their relations. 🗨️





## Conclusions

- ◆ Turkey does not have the potential that would allow the European Union to solve all of its problems in strategically important regions. However, its potential is large enough that a close cooperation of Ankara and Brussels could make the realisation of the EU's goals much more likely.
- ◆ Turkey holds to certain degree the balance in "Eurasian Balkans", that is in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black Sea, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the relations between the EU and Turkey do not intensify, Ankara will choose stronger relations with Russia and Iran. This would limit the EU's potential for playing an important role in the regions discussed.
- ◆ If Turkey's accession process developed at a normal pace, it could be an important instrument for synchronising the foreign policies of Turkey and the EU. It could also neutralise the negative tendencies in Turkish politics.
- ◆ The potential of cooperation with Turkey is currently not adequately taken advantage of by the EU. This is demonstrated most vividly by the comparison of the areas of intensive cooperation such as the Balkans with areas where the European Union's influence is limited while that of Turkey robust.

- ◆ Solving the Cyprus problem would definitely improve cooperation between Turkey and the European Union. If the island were unified, the accession process could gain momentum. However, the freezing of five accession chapters on the initiative of France remains a problem.
- ◆ A separation of Turkey's accession process from its cooperation within the framework of the CFSP is unrealistic. While the intensification of cooperation with Turkey is possible even today, a lasting impasse in the accession negotiations will have a severely negative influence on cooperation within the CFSP framework.
- ◆ A representative of Turkey should be present as an observer during all EU summits concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy towards Eurasia, the Middle East and North Africa.
- ◆ They EU should participate in the negotiations regarding the Cyprus issue. In the case of a lasting impasse in the negotiations to unify the island, the EU should not allow Cyprus to freeze 6 of the negotiating chapters.
- ◆ At the European Council, its members should "convince" France to stop blocking 5 of the accession chapters, in line with commitments accepted by all EU nations when the accession negotiations with Turkey began.
- ◆ The chapters on Energy and Foreign, Security and Defence Policy should be opened as soon as possible.
- ◆ Both sides should develop cooperation between Turkish and EU non-governmental organisations, Turkish embassies and foreign representatives of the EU, and intensify practical cooperation between them.
- ◆ Turkey and the EU should synchronise their policies in organisations where they are either members or observers. 🟠







## Footnotes

<sup>1)</sup> Term coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski referring to the Balkans, the Black Sea region, Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia.

<sup>2)</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Wielka Szachownica* [The Great Chessboard] Warsaw, 1999.

<sup>3)</sup> „OECD Report Predicts Turkey Will Be Fastest-Growing OECD Country in 2011-2017,” [http://www.tusiad.us/specific\\_page.cfm?CONTENT\\_ID=891](http://www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=891)

<sup>4)</sup> In 1979, less than 10% of Turkey’s GDP was foreign trade. In 2008 it was 45% of GDP. In the years 2003-2008 Turkish firms realized building contracts abroad worth around \$84 billion, which is only second to China. The contracts agreed in 2003 were worth \$4 billion, while in 2008 over \$23,5 billion. The majority of these were realized in the countries of the Middle East and former USSR. In the years 2005-2009 (till August) the foreign investment in Turkey was around \$65 billion.

<sup>5)</sup> Turkey’s potential for hydro-energy production is around 30% of the European Union’s. With regard to the geothermal energy Turkey has a 12,5% share of the world resources.

<sup>6)</sup> The Turkish Armed Forces have around 3,000 tanks (1600 modern), 500 fighter aircraft (around 300 modern) 16 frigates and corvettes, and 14 submarines. In respect to the tonnage of the fleet, Turkey is the third country in Europe. Ankara plans to beef up its army by supplying it with modern equipment: 1,000 more tanks, over 115 fighter aircraft, 12 frigates and corvettes, 6 submarines, and a couple of Patriot missile defence batteries.

<sup>7)</sup> It was no mere coincidence that in spring 2009 Barak Obama made his first bilateral visit to Turkey. During the G-20 summit in Pittsburg in September, he met Turkish PM Erdogan again. In December 2009 the prime minister of Turkey visited the U.S.

- <sup>8)</sup> Turkey, which for the last 25 year has been engaged in an armed conflict with Kurdish separatists, was distraught over the alliance between America and the Kurds in Iraq and the obvious strengthening of the Kurdish position in the Middle East.
- <sup>9)</sup> The population living in Turkey will probably get smaller due to the emigration of Turkish citizens to EU member countries.
- <sup>10)</sup> The war between the Turkish army and Kurdish separatists has lasted for 25 years and claimed the lives of almost 40,000 people. Resolving this issue would require a significant increase in the rights of the Kurdish population, but such attempts are hindered because of the definition of a state as centralized and ethnically homogenous. There are, on the other hand, factors which can aid the realization of a more positive scenario, for example the readiness of the elites for reform, wide support for mainstream parties rather than nationalistic parties by most of the Kurdish population, and strong social ties between the Kurdish and Turkish populations. According to sociological studies "self-declared" Kurds form over 10% of Turkey's population, while 5% define themselves as being Kurdish-speaking Turkish citizens. Additionally a small percentage of Turks have Kurdish roots. The percentage of Kurds in the Turkish population will grow in the future due to the higher birth rate among the Kurdish population.
- <sup>11)</sup> By the end of the 1960s most of the Turkish population was analphabetic, and until 1980s lived in the countryside. Currently over 90% of the population is literate, and around 70% lives in cities.
- <sup>12)</sup> In 2002 55% of Turkey's trade was trade with the EU, in 2008 it was around 42%. In the years 2002-2008 trade between Turkey and the European Union increased three times however at the same time, the trade between Turkey and the West Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East grew much more significantly. The economic relations with the EU remained significant for Turkey due to the large amount of EU investments since 2005. They constitute over 75% of all the foreign investments in Turkey.
- <sup>13)</sup> According to the Eurobarometer 69 from 2008 even in the case of fulfilling all of the accession requirements by Turkey, its membership was supported by 45% of EU citizens, while 45% were against Turkey's accession. A study of public opinion shows that a portion of Europeans will not change their views on Turkey's potential membership in the EU even if it would fulfill all of the necessary criteria because they reject the very idea of the membership of a Muslim country.
- <sup>14)</sup> The Austrian population has a strongly negative attitude towards Turkey's accession in all age categories.
- <sup>15)</sup> Turkey's Muslim society is much more conservative and patriarchal than the population of the EU.

- <sup>16)</sup> David Milliband, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, during a conference in Warsaw, organized by demosEUROPA in June 2009
- <sup>17)</sup> The European Commission stated in its first Progress Report in 2005 that Turkey's adjustment to the aquis in the sphere of Common, Foreign and Security Policy needed only a few further efforts, while in the sphere of Foreign Relations no further problems should be expected. According to the reports of the European Commission, which assesses Turkey's process each year, Ankara supported over 95% if the declaration of the CFSP in the period between January – October in 2007. In 2008 it supported around 90% of the declarations and in 2009 almost 80%. Turkey has also voted together with the EU in majority of votes concerning human rights in the United Nations General Assembly.
- <sup>18)</sup> While this situation is partly due to the policy of the AKP, the single most important factor is the rise of self-identification of Turkey as a Muslim country following the world trend after September 11th as well as the growing tensions between the West and the world of Islam. In Turkey this phenomena isn't accompanied by increase of religious practice and radicalism. Conservative-religious part of society is characterized by higher natural growth. On the other hand, a rise of conservatism is enfeeble by increase of prosperity, slow emancipation of women and development of modern education.
- <sup>19)</sup> Adopting a neo-Ottoman approach does not rule out appealing to the unity of Turkic peoples as in the case of Central Asia.
- <sup>20)</sup> Turkey's attempt at a multi-directional foreign policy can also be in the light of the Ottoman legacy, as during the 18th and 19th centuries the empire maneuvered between the European countries strengthening its diplomatic position.
- <sup>21)</sup> In the autumn of 2008 Turkey was elected to the United Nations Security Council with 152 votes out of 192, thus coming before Austria, and Iceland. In the same vote Iran received only 32 votes.
- <sup>22)</sup> Turkey's share in trade between the regions listed above has grown significantly since 2002.
- <sup>23)</sup> There have been some instances however of Turkey exaggerating its role during group mediation for propaganda reasons.
- <sup>24)</sup> The shares in the world's gas reserves are –Russia 23%, Iran 16%, Qatar 14%, Turkmenistan almost 4.5%, Iraq 1.7%, Egypt 1%.
- <sup>25)</sup> The costs for an extension and development of the pipelines bypassing Turkey through the Caucasian and Black Sea would be very high. Another

expensive solution would be an extension of LNG terminals in Europe and the Middle East as well as the pipelines connecting ports to the deposits.

<sup>261</sup> The other members of the project are Austria, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.

<sup>271</sup> The transport of gas from Turkmenistan does not require the construction of a pipeline on the bottom of the Caspian Sea. Gas can be carried by barges or through the mining infrastructure that exists on the sea bed. However this would require an agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

<sup>281</sup> In 2007-2009 Turkey signed a number of initial contracts with Teheran for Turkish gas investments in Iran as well as the construction of a pipeline to transport the gas from Iran and Turkmenistan to Turkey.

<sup>291</sup> The supply of gas from Azerbaijan to the Nabucco pipeline is seen as a priority by Turkey. However the conflict over the price of Azeri gas has been until recently a problem in the dealings between the two. Furthermore there is the problem of Azerbaijan's negative assessment of Turkey's attempt to reach an understanding with Armenia (see further in the report). Baku is trying to exert pressure on Ankara by threatening to develop closer relations with Russia or transporting gas through Georgia and the Black Sea, bypassing Turkey. However the first of these two solutions would be very unfavorable for Azerbaijan while the second very expensive.

<sup>301</sup> The other EU countries participating in this project are: Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary. It has to be constructed over either the Ukrainian or Turkish economic zones. The route through Turkey's zone would be more difficult and involve higher expenses. Turkey permitted technical research for the Southern Stream at the bottom of the Black Sea in its economic zone. The goal of Ankara is to convince Russia to a pragmatic approach to the Nabucco pipeline.

<sup>311</sup> Croatia is treated as part of Western Balkans by the EU, however its situation is much more advanced than that in the rest of the region. It probably will become an EU member in 2011 or 2012.

<sup>321</sup> There are three EU Special Representatives active in the Balkans (in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia) out of the eleven appointed by the European Union.

<sup>331</sup> The Turkish police and officials in EULEX in Kosovo form 4% of the international contingent, while the percentage of Turkish police participating in EUPM in Bosnia is 6%. Turkish police formed 6.5% of the UNMIK mission in Kosovo before 2008. In the military mission EUFOR/ALTHEA the Turks formed 15% percent of the contingent. The EU might, in the future be interested in leading the NATO mission in Kosovo (KFOR) in which Turkey is one of the more significant participants and forms 4% of the contingent.

<sup>341</sup> Turkey has been an important trade partner of Albania (5.5%), Kosovo (7.5%) Bosnia (around 4%) and Macedonia (around 4%) in the years 2008-2009. The

crisis caused a drop in the trade between Turkey and Bosnia, however an increase can be expected after the recession ends. Turkey increased its exports to Bosnia by 250% in 2007. Its investments in Albania make up around 15% of the country's foreign investment inflows. Turkey is also relatively important investor in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina which is one of the two republics forming Bosnia and Herzegovina. An accomplishment of investments signed and planned in Kosovo and Macedonia will establish Turkey as a significant stake-holder in the FDI sector in these countries. Turkish companies also play an important role in Albanian, Kosovian and Macedonian construction industry. A large body of Muslim students from the Western Balkans study in Turkey (around 2,000) and many Turkish universities and secondary schools for non-Turkish students have been opened in Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo.

<sup>35)</sup> Turkey actively supports NATO membership aspirations of the Western Balkan countries. In 2009 Turkey established the Friends of Bosnia Group within the NATO. Since then the Group has been led by Ankara. Turkey also criticized the EU for tolerating Greece's blocking of Macedonia's accession process and not liberalizing the visa system for Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo.

<sup>36)</sup> During the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) Turkish members of the UN peace keeping force were deemed as impartial peacekeepers in the Croat-Bosnian regions. After the war the Croatian and Bosniak soldiers from the Army of Federation of BiH were trained in Turkey. Turkey's relations with Croatia remained good even during the war between Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia in 1993-1994. In 2009 Turkey's relations with Serbia improved significantly, following some historic visits and the signing of a free trade agreement. Thanks to this Turkey established a mechanism of three-sided consultation between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia, Serbia and itself in order to stabilise the situation in Bosnia. A Plan of Action for Bosnia was also accepted during a meeting in Sarajevo in December 2009 with the aim to develop the cooperation between the three countries and lobby for Bosnia's accession to NATO and the EU. Within this framework Turkey encourages Serbia to issue an official condemnation of the genocide committed by the Serbs on the Bosniaks. There are negotiations about the character of such a declaration. Turkey also established a similar mechanism of cooperation between itself, Bosnia and Croatia and hoping that in the long term cooperation between all the members of the region can be established. In February 2010 a meeting between Davutoglu and the representatives of Bosniaks, Croatians and Serbs in Bosnia is supposed to be held. The greatest challenge for Ankara is the hostility of Bosnian Serbs towards Turkey.

<sup>37)</sup> In Serbia Turkey is perceived very positively in the strategically important region of Sandzak. In Macedonia the orthodox majority also perceives Turkey extremely well.

<sup>38)</sup> The Turkish army trained the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1990s. This eliminated the influence of Islamic radical-

isms. The majority of Albania's officers were also trained in Turkey. The Turkish armed forces belong to the most significant "caretakers" of Kosovo's armed forces.

<sup>39)</sup> There are four regional conflicts which are now in a standstill (Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Southern Ossetia) all of which may become active as was demonstrated during the war between Russia and Georgia. There have been frequent incidents of social and political unrest in this region. The Northern Caucasus region in Russia is an area of military conflict in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia.

<sup>40)</sup> The countries that belong to the Eastern Partnership are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

<sup>41)</sup> The EU mission in Georgia on the border of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia cannot operate on the territories of Southern Ossetia.

<sup>42)</sup> Three EU countries are members of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, while five have the status of observers.

<sup>43)</sup> Around 30% of Ukraine's trade is with the EU. However the EU investments in Ukraine are only 5% of GDP (after excluding investment from Cyprus and partially the Netherlands, as these are usually of Russian or Ukrainian origin).

<sup>44)</sup> Turkey has relatively strong position in the republics of the Russian Federation for example Tatarstan and Bashkortostan – which are inhabited by Muslims of Turkic origin. Turkey is the most important trading partner with Tatarstan. Turkish construction companies are very active in Tatarstan, Ankara increases its investment and has close political relations with the governments of both the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Bashkortostan.

<sup>45)</sup> Russia is interested in good relations with Turkey because of strong economic links, in order to keep Turkey's foreign policy independent from the EU and USA, and finally because of Turkey's significance in global energy politics.

<sup>46)</sup> Because Turkey has LNG ports and an infrastructure which allows for the import of gas from other countries it is not completely dependent on Russia. Turkey also has high potential for diversification of sources of gas due to its location.

<sup>47)</sup> Turkey did not condemn explicitly Russia's recognition of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, but only voiced support for Georgia's territorial integrity and alarm at Russia's decision.

<sup>48)</sup> Turkey is the most important trade partner of Abkhazia (over half of the trade of Abkhazia is with Turkey). There is a large Abkhazian community

living in Turkey, larger than that in Abkhazia itself. The president of Abkhazia announced he will visit Turkey informally in the beginning of 2010. Abkhazia's government plans to offer citizenship to the diaspora. If this happens, relations between Turkey and Abkhazia will strengthen even more. On the other hand, organizing elections for Abkhazian citizens in Turkey would definitely have a negative result on Ankara's relations with Georgia. Abkhazia is interested in closer relations with Turkey in order to decrease its dependency on Russia. In September 2009 a Turkish secretary of state made a visit to Abkhazia. This was the first visit of such an important member of the Turkish government to Sukhumi.

<sup>49)</sup> 5% of the foreign trade of Moldova and Ukraine was with Turkey. The economic crisis caused a drop in the exchange between Turkey and Ukraine, after the countries recover from the recession however trade will most likely return to the previous level.

<sup>50)</sup> According to both Ankara and Baku, Azerbaijan is the second country of the same Turkish nation. Turkey is a very important trade partner to Baku (8-9%) and the most important investor (15%). The Turkish market, especially the energy sector, is extremely significant to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's investments in Turkey are worth almost \$7.5 billion. Azerbaijan is thus one of the most important foreign investors in Turkey. In the years 2003-2008 the Turkish construction contracts in Azerbaijan were worth \$2,500,000,000 while its GDP was \$75 000,000,000. Turkey and Azerbaijan are also linked through education as around 35% of all of Azerbaijan's students studying abroad do so in Turkey, and the majority of foreign students in Azerbaijan (around 3% of all students) are Turkish.

Turkey is also the most important trade partner to Georgia (over 15%) and a significant investor (soon almost 10%). Turkish companies play an important role in Georgia's construction sector. Turkish building contracts in Georgia in the years 2003-2007 were worth around \$730, 000,000 while Georgia's GDP was around \$21,000,000,000. Many Georgians and Azeris visit Turkey for economic purposes. The relations between the three countries can be expected to intensify further in the next few years. This should be aided by the new train route (Baku-Alkhalkalaki-Kars) which will connect Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish government authored this idea. In the case of Turkey's relations with Armenia, Turkey may soon become one of its most significant trade partners, though Russia will probably remain the most important. Currently Turkey's share in Armenia's imports is around 5%.

<sup>51)</sup> Turkey established military academies in Baku and Tbilisi. It modernized important military bases in Georgia and trained some of the special forces of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Most of the officers of the Azerbaijan armed forces and many of the Georgian officers were trained in Turkey. There were units from Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Turkish contingent in Kosovo.

<sup>52)</sup> Azerbaijan threatens Turkey that it will strengthen its relations with Russia, or that gas will be transported to Europe bypassing Turkey. See footnote 29

- <sup>531</sup> Turkey makes the implementation of the protocols dependent on the development of the negotiations regarding Karabakh.
- <sup>541</sup> Around 17% of the world's uranium deposits, 6% of the gas deposits, 5% of the coal deposits and around 4% of the world's oil deposits are located in Central Asia.
- <sup>551</sup> Brussels appointed a Special Representative for Central Asia in 2005. In 2006 Brussels initiated the first, 6-year strategy for this region. The first-ever EU-Central Asia Forum was organised in 2008. The EU is also an important trade partner for Kazakhstan (around 30% of Kazakhstan's trade). The share of the EU in Kazakhstan's trade volume is the largest of all of the countries in the region. The EU's trade with Uzbekistan is around 15%. Investment inflow from the EU into Kazakhstan is around 25% (excluding partially the inflow from the Netherlands as these are usually non-European investments registered in the Netherlands) of the foreign investment in Kazakhstan.
- <sup>561</sup> Turkey has played a very significant role as a NATO representative in this region. Ankara was one of the most important partners of the armed forces within the Partnership for Peace.
- <sup>571</sup> Turkey is an important trade partner for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (around 7% of their trade). In Tajikistan, Turkey has a large share in the construction industry. It is also an important partner to Kazakhstan in areas such as investment, trade and construction. In both Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan there are active Turkish universities.
- <sup>581</sup> Turkey's share in the trade of Turkmenistan is around 10%. It also has a huge share in the construction industry. Turkish companies completed contract worth \$8.2 billion in the years 2003-2008. The GDP of Turkmenistan is \$30 billion. Turkey has an important position among foreign investors as well. Ankara is linked with Ashgabat through education. Almost 30% of Turkmen students study abroad, most of them in Turkey. Ahmed Celik, one of the most important businessmen in Turkey, was a deputy minister in Turkmenistan's government.
- <sup>591</sup> Neologism used to refer to Afghanistan and Pakistan emphasizing the close connection between the two.
- <sup>601</sup> There was a high number of meetings between the politicians of Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the difficulties in relations between Islamabad and Kabul since 2007. These meeting led to a clear improvement of their relations and initiated cooperation between the two.
- <sup>611</sup> Turkey is leading the ISAF mission for the third time, being the most often chosen leader except for the United States. The Turkish diplomat Hekmit Cetin was chosen the NATO Secretary General's Senior Civilian Representative in the years 2003-2006. The Turkish contingent is always increased when Turkey takes over the leadership of the mission. Currently it is around 1,700 soldiers, which is almost 3% of the ISAF forces. The Provincial Re-

construction Team (PRT) organised by Turkey has been very effective, and is unique because of its civilian character. Turkey plans to open a new PRT in the beginning of the year. It realised over 550 social project (schools, hospitals, ambulatories, and public offices) in around 80% of the provinces. Around 7,000,000 people benefited from the projects. Turkey is also planning to open two universities in Afghanistan in 2010.

<sup>62)</sup> In recent years Turkey sent a lot of humanitarian aid to Pakistan, for example during the exodus from the Swat Valley and earthquakes. Afghanistan received 45% of Turkish external aid in 2008. In 2008 Ankara donated \$200 million to Afghanistan and additional \$100 million in 2009.

<sup>63)</sup> Turkish construction work in Afghanistan was worth around \$1,8 billion in the years 2003-2008 while the GDP of Afghanistan is around \$21 billion. Turkey's significance as a trade partner to Afghanistan is also growing. In 2008 Turkey's share in the trade of Afghanistan was around 2.5% while that of the entire EU was 18%. Turkey is also an important investor in Afghanistan.

<sup>64)</sup> In October 2009 Pakistan announced it will introduce a reform in religious education on the basis of the Turkish experience.

<sup>65)</sup> The main social problems are poverty, low social status of women and illiteracy. The political problems are authoritarianism and fundamentalism present in the region. The main economic problems are the limited economic liberty and the domination of the energy sector. Finally the high growth rate and young society of the region are the main of the demographic problems.

<sup>66)</sup> Libya is the only country which is not a member of this organization, however it does have the status of an observer.

<sup>67)</sup> The EU has a share of 55%-80% in the trade of the Maghreb region. Almost half of foreign investment inflows in the region come from the EU. In some of the Maghreb countries, for example Morocco and Tunisia, foreign investment inflows are a very significant part of their GDP. The EU is also an important partner for these countries because of tourism and remittances.

<sup>68)</sup> Turkey was the author of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative which was initiated at the NATO summit in Istanbul in 2004. Its aim is to intensify the cooperation between NATO and the countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa.

<sup>69)</sup> Because of this Turkey has right now the second biggest influence on Hamas, Iran being the first.

<sup>70)</sup> The effectiveness of Turkey's policy towards Iran will depend on Iran's political situation. The affirmative policy that Ankara adopted towards the

current regime in Iran may be problematic for Turkey in the future. The lack of stability of Iran's political system, as well as the serious economic crisis, may cause the ruling elite to fall and be exchanged by the opposition. If so then the new government, formed out of the politicians of the opposition may be negatively predisposed towards Turkey. On the other hand, there is relatively strong social support for the regime and the demonstrations against it are limited only to big cities. The regime also controls the security forces.

<sup>71)</sup> After the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the Lebanese prime minister in 2005, Turkey did not condemn Syria which was accused for organizing the murder by the EU. Under the influence of Turkey's soft power, Syria adopted a more pro-western policy and withdrew its troops from Lebanon. Syria also secured the border with Iraq more effectively which limited the support of anti-American partisan movements. Against the position of Iran, Syria also took part in 2007 in the summit in Annapolis which was organized by the United State in order to renew the peace process in the Middle East. Syria also supported the concept of forming a new government in Lebanon in 2008. It began negotiations with Israel which were mediated by Turkey. A U.S. embassy is to be opened in Damascus soon.

<sup>72)</sup> One of the leaders of Hamas visited Turkey in 2006. Ankara was criticized for this in Europe. However, Turkey says it has pressed that Hamas give up on using violence and begin negotiations with Israel, which Turkey would mediate. This resulted in only a short ceasefire. Thanks to the visit, Hamas received some legitimization on the global political scene.

<sup>73)</sup> Turkey was also engaged in the Barcelona Process, which preceded the Union for the Mediterranean. It demonstrated a high level of cooperation with the EU within the framework of this initiative. Out of all the Muslim countries, only Turkey and the Palestinian Autonomy took part in the summit in November 2005.

<sup>74)</sup> Formed of the neighbors of Iraq, the G-8, UN, OIC, the Arab League and the European Commission. Its aim is the stabilization of Iraq.

<sup>75)</sup> In April 2007, a meeting between Javier Solana and Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Highest Security Council of Iran was held due to Turkey's influence. This meeting led to a technical agreement between Teheran and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

<sup>76)</sup> 26 countries were for, 3 against and 6 abstained from voting. These who abstained were Turkey, Afghanistan, South Africa, Brazil, Egypt and Pakistan.

<sup>77)</sup> Turkey's share in trade of the MENA region increased rapidly in 2009. The decrease in Turkish trade with this region at the time was much lower than that with other regions. There was even an increase of trade with some of the Arab countries. Around 5% of the Turkish trade was with this region in 2002. In 2009 it was around 17.5%. The increase was spectacular

in the trade with Qatar for example – Turkey’s trade with Qatar increased almost 70 times in the years 2002-2008. Turkish companies completed construction contracts worth around \$40,000,000,000 in this region over the years 2003-2008. In Libya and Qatar for example the worth of completed constructions was around \$9,100,000,000 and \$5,700,000,000 respectively while the GDP of Libya is around \$90,000,000,000 and of Qatar \$94,000,000,000. There is also a large amount of foreign investment inflows into Turkey from countries in the Persian Gulf (around 5% of all the foreign investment in Turkey).

<sup>78)</sup> Turkey participated in programmes to rebuild Lebanon and Palestine after the destructions caused by the wars with Israel. Ankara donated \$150,000,000 to Palestine in 2008. Turkey’s most important non-governmental initiative in the Middle East was the Industry for Peace Initiative. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey was the author of this idea and the initiative was joined by business councils of Palestine and Israel. During the time of peace there were 7 meetings between the representatives from three countries and a number of Turkish investments were completed in Palestine. The Turkish side declared it will broaden the scope of the initiative to encompass the entire Middle East.

<sup>79)</sup> In 1999 Turkey threatened Syria with a military intervention. Ten years later the first joint military manoeuvres were held.

<sup>80)</sup> Turkey played a role of the middleman, organizing a meeting of the U.S ambassador and the Sunni leaders from Iraq in Istanbul. Thanks to this the Sunni leaders decided to take part in the parliamentary elections. Thanks to the Turkish mediation, a ceasefire was signed by one fraction of the Iraqi Sunni rebels and the USA in 2009. In 2008 Turkey helped mediate an agreement between the government and the opposition in Lebanon on the election of a new president and the establishment of a government of national unity. Thanks to Turkish mediation, Iranian diplomats taken prisoner in Iraq by the USA and British diplomats taken hostage in Teheran were released in 2007 and 2009. In August 2009 Turkey mediated a three-way mechanism for solving problems between itself, Iraq and Syria. It also played a significant role in the backstage diplomatic actions which led to a stop in the fights between the Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, as well as Shiite-Sunni fighting in Iraq. In the last case very helpful was a fact that Turkey which is itself Sunni, was in good relations with the Shiites.

<sup>81)</sup> The frequency of the visits of Turkish politicians in Israel cannot be compared to those of any other country of the region. In 2007 Simon Peres the president of Israel and Mahmoud Abbas the president of Palestine travelled together to the summit in Annapolis from Turkey where they had earlier both spoken for the Turkish parliament. This was the first time ever that the president of Israel gave a speech to the parliament of a Muslim country.

- <sup>82)</sup> In August 2009 joint maneuvers of the American, Turkish and Israeli fleets were held on Turkish territorial waters. The Israeli arms industry supplies the Turkish army.
- <sup>83)</sup> Turkey's share in Syria's trade is around 5%. Turkish investment flows into Syria are the highest, (10%). In the case of Iraq, Turkish investments are around 3% of all the foreign inflows. Turkey's share in Iraq's trade is around 10%. In the years 2003-2008 the Turkish construction contracts completed in Iraq were worth \$4,800,000,000, while the GDP of that country is around \$105,000,000,000. In Iraq, Turkey has a dominating economic position in the autonomous region of Kurdistan. In October 2009, Turkey signed several agreements with both countries, which created an opportunity for enhanced economic cooperation. In the case of Iraq, another favorable factor could be an increase in oil and gas exports through Turkey to Europe. The strong influence of Turkey on Syria and Iraq results to a large extent from the geographic conditions. The border between Turkey, Iraq and Syria is dominated by high mountains while most of the rivers are situated on the Turkish side. Thus, about 80 percent of Syrian and 50 percent of Iraqi demand for water (a very rare good in the Middle East) comes from Turkey.
- <sup>84)</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Kurdistan was a historic event in the process of reconciliation. There is also a Turkish university active since 2009 in Iraqi Kurdistan.
- <sup>85)</sup> Closer relations between Turkey and Egypt began in 2008 when the Fatah movement turned to Turkey to mediate in a dispute with the Hamas. Turkey then invited Cairo to join in.
- <sup>86)</sup> In 2008 Turkey's share in Iran's trade turnover was around 5,5%. The investments in the gas reserves in Iran planned by Turkey are estimated to be worth \$4 billion, which if realised, would grant Turkey much influence in Iran. The Azeri and Turkmen minorities in Iran, both of which use Turkish media, are also a factor that favours Turkey's position in Iran.
- <sup>87)</sup> Turkey has good relations with the Shiites in Iran and Lebanon where it was the only Sunni country giving aid to the Shiite part of the country. It is also worth to remember that Syria is ruled by the Alawi, a branch of Islam close to the Shia.
- <sup>88)</sup> In the opinion polls carried out by TESEV in 2009 in seven of the most important Arab countries in the Middle East, one of the best Turkish think-tanks, around 80% of the respondents felt that the role of Turkey in the Arab countries should increase, and that Turkey should be a mediator in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Only around 15% were against. Over 60% felt that Turkey can be a model for the Arab countries and that it is effective in its synthesis of Islam and democracy. Over 25% were against the notion. Around 2/3 were supportive of Turkey's representation of the Arab interests on the international stage and viewed Turkey's potential EU membership as profitable for the Middle East. Around 20% were against.

<sup>891</sup> Political parties which refer explicitly to the AKP are the al-Wasat in Egypt, the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan.

<sup>901</sup> The Arab media have been closely following the situation in Turkey, especially with regard to its relations with the EU. Hundreds of journalists from Arab countries were relating live from Brussels during EU summits when the question of Turkish membership was on the agenda.

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is an international, non-partisan policy-orientated research institution which aims to provide answers to the challenges facing the European Union, its Member States and the citizens. It is a forum for ideas about the political, social and economic dimension of European integration and international relations.

One of the key objectives is to promote an active, engaged and unequivocally pro-European role of Poland as a Member State. The activity of demosEUROPA is based on the belief that only by being at the heart of Europe, will Poland best serve the interests of its business community and citizens.

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