Thursday, 07 January 2010 15:23

EU–Ukraine – time for a reset?

Paweł Zerka

Ukraine is mired in a political and economic crisis. Mutual disappointment reigns in Kiev’s relations with the European Union. In this context, the forthcoming presidential election creates an opportunity for some consolidation regardless of who wins. If this came to pass, the EU should respond with a “reset” offer.

Yulia catching up with Viktor
If opinion surveys are right, Viktor Yanukovych is likely to become president. In mid-December he was supported by 33 percent of voters, substantially more than Yulia Tymoshenko (19 percent). If these forecasts prove right in the first round of voting on January 17, they will face each other off again in the second round on February 7. Polls predict that in the second round Yanukovych would beat Tymoshenko by 42 percent to 28 percent. However, publication of further surveys is banned since January 2, whereas quite a lot can change during the last two weeks before the voting.

Two other candidates  are competing for the third place: ex-President of the National Bank, Sergei Tigipko, and former Vice President of National Bank, Minister of Economy and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Each of them can receive between 5 and 10 percent.  If either reached the magical 10 percent  level, he would gain a strong position in endorsement negotiations with Tymoshenko before the second round, especially if she failed to reduce  the 14 percentage point gap to the leader of the Party of Regions. Although Yatsenyuk said that he would not support anyone in the second round if he himself did not get there, it seems quite likely that a perspective of taking part in the new government could make him change his mind. All the more since his electorate, concentrated in Western Ukraine, would anyway vote in the second round for Tymoshenko. As for Tigipko, he should be more open for talks and would eagerly support Tymoshenko provided that he is invited to form a new government, possibly as a new prime minister.

Ukrainians are increasingly angry about the impact of the economic crisis, which is of course favorable for Yanukovych. The popular feeling is that the country is in a need of a new, strong leader who would calm down the political and economic turmoil. Yanukovych fulfills this criterion. What is more, he is on very good terms with Russia, and hence he would prevent another “gas war” in the middle of the winter . Finally, many Ukrainians who believed that the Orange Revolution would be a step towards democratization and integration of Ukraine with the EU, are so disillusioned that they will rather abstain from voting – which further reinforces the chances of the leader of the “Blue Camp”.

Nevertheless, Yanukovych has always had a problem of winning the support of those living in Kiev and in western and central Ukraine. During the last parliamentary elections, his Party of Regions obtained 34 percent of votes in the country, but the result in the capital was a mere 15 percent. In comparison, the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) obtained 30 percent nationally  and 46 percent in the capital. Yanukovych's leading position in the surveys today  is to a lesser extent a question of gaining new support, and rather the effect of disappointment among the Orange electorate.

This explains why Tymoshenko is not without any chance to win in the secound round. If she succeeded in mobilizing the Orange electorate, then – just like in 2004 -- the Blue candidate could suffer a defeat. Several factors are favorable for the current prime minister. First of all, it is not hard to imagine that in the second round she could seize the electorate of Tigipko, Yatsenyuk or Yushchenko. Secondly, she has the same assets as Yanukovych (being tough and on good terms with Putin) but unlike him she is also charismatic – which in Ukraine is still very important. Thirdly, just like the Civic Platform in the last parliamentary elections in Poland, Tymoshenko may gain the support of those who do not necessarily like her but who are afraid of the possible victory of Yanukovych. However, it should be underlined that this time the “threat factor” will be far more limited than in 2004. Last but not least, there are still no independent opinion polls in Ukraine and those which are available have a peculiar tendency of constantly underscoring Tymoshenko and her Bloc. For example, during the last parliamentary elections they obtained 31 percent  of the votes while the surveys normally gave them around 20 percent.

But Tymoshenko must first deal with the disappointment which looms over her electorate. Whether she manages to persuade her voters that she is not responsible for the current crisis, and that (just the opposite) she is the one who will stabilize the situation – is still an open question. Although the EU is not a central topic in her campaign, it seems that the “European fatigue” of many Ukrainians will work to her disadvantage.

Pragmatism, stupid!
The current presidential elections do not have the same Manichaean dimension as those 5 years ago. Voters are attaching less importance to the ideology, and more to the charisma and pragmatism.  This is one of the reasons why the charm of Yushchenko’s highly ideological arguments, embedded in historical and geopolitical thinking, are not working anymore.

Nonetheless, from the point of view of the EU, it is not all the same whether the new president is Yanukovych or Tymoshenko. Both are highly pragmatic figures, but the former is 100 percent pragmatic while the latter leaves some percent for her delicate pro-European inclination – and for her ambition, which explains why she is considered less predictable.

In the case of Yanukovych, there is no clarity whether he would be determined to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, or prefer the customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazachstan – especially if the EU didn’t show that it cared. We do know that he is not a NATO enthusiast, but still we cannot predict whether this means that he would favour Ukraine’s accession into the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. However, we should remember that his much-talked about allegiance to Russia will surely be limited by the economic interests of eastern Ukraine – which is why, paradoxically, we should expect from him to push for the reinforcement of the EU-Ukraine dialog.  

As for Tymoshenko, she has perfectly mastered the art of steering a middle course between Russia and the EU, while maintaining the aura of being delicately more pro-European. Judging by the appearances, it seems that her presidency would be more favourable for a revival of EU-Ukraine relations . Unfortunately, after the last couple of years, rich in incomprehensible intrigues, she fully deserves the opinion of a “limited liability politician”. 

The devil is not so black... and the other way round
This is why the EU should neither cross out the possibility of coming to terms with Viktor Yanukovych, nor should rest too much hope in Yulia Tymoshenko.

First of all, Yanukovych –should be open to a dialog with the EU, although this would depend on the European willingness to compromise. The EU and Ukraine under Yanukovych should tighten their relations but this will demand more effort and more patience from the EU.

Secondly, we shouldn’t assume that Ukraine is bound for a success just because both of the leading candidates are capable of restoring order in the country. There is more than just one ‘but’ here. The presidential power was to a considerable extent limited in 2005, which means that the current elections are only a beginning of an arduous process of stabilisation. Right after the election a fierce bargaining for power will begin, with the post of prime minister and participation in the ruling coalition being the trump card.

This means both a risk and a chance. If Yanukovych wins and does not manage to come to terms with the current prime minister, Ukraine would enter a difficult phase which would only intensify the current crisis. The revised constitution puts limits on the presidential power in dissolving the Parliament, and therefore Yanukovych, if he wanted to announce preliminary elections in order to get rid of Tymoshenko, would either have to cooperate with the supporters of Yushchenko (which, by the way, would be a political Deus ex machina for the current president) or smartly exploit loopholes in the constitution. If he succeeded in dissolving the Parliament, he might use the momentum to increase the representation of the Party of Regions. However, it is highly unlikely that he could do without the support of his former rivals in the presidential elections in order to form a ruling coalition. Therefore, his power would surely be limited.

Tymoshenko will most probably lose in the first round, therefore she will be desperate to gain support of the remaining candidates – especially Tigipko. If she manages to secure this support, and if it enables her to overtake Yanukovych in the second round, she will have to make concessions to her new partner, probably giving him the post of the Prime Minister in a new majority government – which would then be highly divided internally. Another option will be to take a gamble and call early  elections. In that case, she might use the momentum to consolidate her power. But we can also imagine that the victory of the Party of Regions is such that she will be forced into a cohabitation, which would be difficult by definition.

The Tymoshenko-Tigipko tandem has a potential of being efficient and favorable for stabilisation, but its performance would depend on the disposition of both politicians to compromise. It could be subject to the same frictions as Yanukovych with the government formed by the internally divided  Party of Regions, possibly supported by the camps of  Yushchenko and Yatsenyuk.

Whatever comes, the mere fact of having a new political configuration, as well as the pragmatism which characterizes both of the main protagonists, offer a chance for a more constructive relations between the president and the prime minister.

Time for a reset?
There is no agreement in the EU regarding Ukraine’s place in Europe and its possible EU accession. The EU has good reasons to be wary of Ukraine, after Kiev apparently lied to Brussels in May 2009 about the allegedly critical situation in its gas sector. The EU can be frustrated by the lack of reforms in Ukraine, in spite of repeated Kiev's declarations. However, Brussels bears a substantial part of the blame because the EU has failed to introduce some form of a visa-free movement for Ukrainians or make the prospect of EU membership more tangible.

The current state of mutual mistrust is in the long term damaging for both sides. This is why, provided that the elections  indeed lead to stabilisation, the EU should come up with an initiative of a ‘reset’. Such an initiative would envisage a step forward by both parties. The EU would decide to accelerate the talks about the Association Agreement and would clearly suggest that the possibility of accession is open to Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine would have to come up with a credible programme of reforms and begin implementing them. At the same time, both the EU and Ukraine would have to strengthen their dialog with Russia, to reduce Moscow’s apprehension of EU enlargement and demonstrate  it is not the old-fashioned  game of spheres of influence.